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"Every man knoweth, that for Manners and Prescriptions, there is great
diversity among all Nations: but for the customes observed in the course of
trafficke and commerce, there is that sympathy, concordance, and agreement,
which nay be said to be of like condition to all people, diffused and spread
by right reason, and instinct of nature consisting perpetually."
-MALYNs, Lex Mercatoria (1622)
In an age of diversity among legal systems, we can look back with
nostalgia to the hegemony of the law merchant, when commercial men
could order their affairs according to an international body of custom
which was applied with some consistency by the special commercial
courts in the principal trading states of Western Europe. But by
the time of Malynes in the seventeenth century, the fragmentation of
this body of custom had already begun; it was soon absorbed in differ-
ing degrees by such developing legal systems as those of England and
France, so that little remained of the uniformity which once facilitated
foreign trade.
The result has not been a happy one for international commerce,
and it is not surprising that in recent years a sustained assault has been
mounted to break down the barriers raised by this diversity. The
assault is waged on many fronts: through unification of the law,
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through preparation of standard form contracts, through definition of
trade terms, through arbitration, and through choice of law and choice
of forum. A good part of this effort is concerned with the movement
of goods in foreign trade, and of this none is more fundamental and
fraught with difficulties than that relating to the very formation of the
contract of sale itself. Three recent initiatives are particularly notable:
the Draft Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, prepared by the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law in Rome (the Rome Draft);' the Prelim-
inary Draft of a Convention on a Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Tangible Personal Property, prepared under the Inter-American
Council of Jurists (the Inter-American Draft); and the general
conditions for sale prepared by the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe (the ECE conditions).
I. THREE ATTEMPTS AT UNIFICATION
A. The Rome Draft
The Rome Institute's work on the formation of contracts for the
international sale of goods began in 1934, when this subject was
separated from the Institute's general work on sales. By 1936 a
draft Uniform Law on International Contracts by Correspondence
had been prepared.3 Progress was halted by World War II, and the
work was not resumed until 1956. By 1958 a new draft-the Rome
Draft-had been prepared by the Council of the Institute.4  Mean-
while, the general work on sales had culminated in the Draft Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods (the Hague Sales Draft),"
which was revised by a special committee named at a conference at
The Hague in 1951. In the hope that the Rome Draft might be
brought before a diplomatic conference similar to that held on the
1 This draft, published in 1959, is reprinted, in translation, in Appendix I to this
Article. It is hereinafter cited as RoME DRAFT.
2 The portions of this draft, published in 1960, which apply to the formation of
international sales contracts are reprinted in Appendix II to this article. It is herein-
after cited as INTER-AmERIcAN DRAFT.
3 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF A UNIFORm LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS MADE BY CORRESPONDENCE
(1937).
4 The history of the draft is contained in the report, which appears only in the
French version. INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL POUR L'UNIFICATION DU DROIT PRIv. ,
PROJET DE Loi UNIFORME SUR LA FORMATION DES CONTRATS DE VENTE INTERNATIONALE
DES OBJETS MOBIUERS CORPORELS ET RAPPORT 13-14 (1959).
5 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT OF A
UNIFORM LAw ON INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CORPOREAL. MOVABLES) (1957)
[hereinafter cited as HAGUE SALES DRAFT]. -See generally Donovan, The Unification
of Intertfational Ccnmercial Law-Sale and Arbitration, 2 MELBOURNE U.L. Rxv. 172
(1959); Honnold, A Uniform Law for International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 299
(1959).
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Hague Sales Draft, the Institute transmitted the product of its work
to the Dutch government in 1959.' The Dutch government has already
solicited and received the opinions of foreign govermnents in prepara-
tion for such a conference.
The Institute has adhered to its original decision to keep the draft
law on formation of sales contracts separate from that on sales gen-
erally so that the acceptance of the 113 articles of the latter will not be
impeded by the difficulty of securing agreement on the fourteen articles
of the former.' However, the Rome Draft differs in scope from the
Institute's 1936 draft in two major respects. First, it is not limited to
the formation of contracts by correspondence, as was the earlier draft,
but covers the formation of contracts by any means.8  Second, it does
not apply to the formation of all contracts, as did its predecessor, but
is limited to the formation of those contracts for the international sale
of goods which fall within the purview of the Hague Sales Draft.9 In
general, this limitation restricts its operation to contracts between
parties whose places of business or habitual residences are in different
countries. There must also be an additional international element,
namely, the fact that the goods have been or will be carried from one
country to another, that the acts constituting offer and acceptance took
place in different countries, or that delivery is to be made in a country
other than that in which these acts took place."0 The Rome Draft, like
the Hague Sales Draft, rejects the distinction found in many civil law
countries, yet unfamiliar to American lawyers," between commercial
and noncommercial sales.'
2
B. The Inter-American Draft
The second recent initiative, the Inter-American Draft, grew out
of a resolution of the Inter-American Council of Jurists, an organ of
6A study of the rules relating to contract formation had been recommended by
the 1951 conference. AcTzs DE LA cONFLRENCE CONVOQUtE PAR LE GOUVERNM ENT
ROYAL DES PAYS-BAS SUR UN PROJET DE CONVENTION RELATIF ) UNE LOI UNIFORME
SUR LA VENT D'oBjETS moBILIERs coRPoRExs 277 (1952).
71NSTITUT INTERNATIONAL POUR L'UNIFICATION DU DROIT PsIvP, PROJET DUNE
Loi UNiFORsr SUR LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DES OBJETS MOBILIERS CORPORELS,
NOUVEAU TEXTE RLABo1 PAR LA COMMISSION ET RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION 29
(1956).
s Conpare ROME DRAFT art 2, with the PRELImInARY DRAFT OF A UNIFORM
LAw ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS BY CORRESPONDENCE art. 1 (1937).
9 RoME DRAFT art. 2.
10 HAGUE SALES DRAFT art 2. This provision is discussed in more detail in
Honnold, supra note 5, at 304-06. A few minor exceptions are set out in HAGUE SALES
DAFT art. 8.
"1 The Sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code does contain a few special
rules applicable only where one or both parties are "merchants." But there is no
general division of transactions into commercial and noncommercial sales. See UNI-
FORM Com .RcIAL CODE § 2-104 and Comments.
1
2
ROME DRAFT art. 2; HAGUE SALES DRAFT art. 11.
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the Council of the Organization of American States, which at its first
meeting in 1950 entrusted to its permanent committee, the Inter-
American Juridical Committee, a study of uniformity of legislation on
the sale of personal property.3 This study resulted in a first draft,' 4
which was succeeded by a second draft prepared by the Council of
Jurists at its second meeting in Buenos Aires in 1953."5 A preliminary
study of the second draft, together with a revised version-the Inter-
American Draft-were discussed at the Committee's meeting in 1959.
Since publication in 1960 they have been circulated by the Department
of Legal Affairs of the Pan American Union for comments. The
draft is intended for adoption throughout the Americas. Unlike the
Hague Sales Draft, it includes the four articles on formation of sales
contracts within its fifty-three articles on sales in general. However,
it, too, is limited to international sales, which are defined generally as
those between parties whose places of business or habitual residences
are in different countries, and then only if the goods or the price must
be transferred from one country to another. 6 And it, too, rejects any
distinction between commercial and noncommercial sales.
1'7
C. The ECE Conditions
The third initiative, which has resulted in the ECE conditions,
has been along different lines and has been the most productive of
concrete results. Rather than attempt unification of the law itself,
it has sought to minimize the practical effects of diversity by the use
of uniform standard contract forms. During the last decade, such
general conditions have been prepared for the international sale of a
number of commodities under the auspices of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe."8 Each document has been the
product of a group of experts representing most of the European
nations on both sides of the Iron Curtain and speaking for the inter-
ests of both sellers and buyers in the trade or industry involved. The
Is INTER-AmERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS, FINAL ACT OF THE FIRST MEETING 14,
18 (1950). On the Inter-American Juridical Committee in general, see Murdock &
Gobbi, The Inter-American Juridical Committee, 9 Am. J. Coux. L. 596 (1960).
14 INTER-AmERICAN JURIDICAL CommITrE, DRAFT UNrIFORm LAW ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1953).
15 INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS, FINAL ACT OF THE SECOND MEETING
31-43 (1953).
1 6 INTER-AMERCAN DRAFT art. 2. In art. 3 there are certain minor exceptions,
as in the ROME DRAFr art 2.
17 INTER-AmERICAN DRAFT art 1.
18 On the history of the ECE conditions, see Benjamin, E.C.E. General Condi-
tions of Sale and Standard Forms of Contract, 1961 Bus. L.J. 113. Contracts have
been drawn up for such trades as plant and machinery, solid fuels, timber, citrus
fruits, and cereals.
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eventual use of the conditions, however, is a matter for contracting
parties to decide for themselves. The ECE conditions have met
with acceptance for several reasons: they are specially designed to give
definitive answers to those questions which might be answered dif-
ferently under different legal systems; they avoid the overreaching
found in many form contracts because they have been prepared under
the auspices of an impartial body after discussion by representatives of
both sellers and buyers; 19 and once they become familiar through use,
they avoid the need for detailed examination of fine print and facilitate
comparison of offers. The ECE conditions affect not only the obliga-
tions of the parties under the contract of sale, but the formation of the
contract as well, since they contain provisions on contract formation
which become operative through their incorporation in the offer.
D. Some Basic Considerations
The Rome and Inter-American drafts are alternative legislative
solutions to the problem of diversity. Although the former has been
under study for a longer time, neither has been subjected to extensive
review by independent legal and business experts, and neither is in
final form. Both are deserving of attention in the United States.
There is, of course, the rather remote chance that one or the other
might be adopted by this country. Beyond this, there is the more
real possibility that, if adopted by other nations, they would apply to
contracts involving American business, either under the rules of the
draft itself, under general conflict of laws rules, or under choice of law
clauses. It should be remembered that neither draft requires that
either party have his place of business or habitual residence in one of
the countries that have adopted the draft, provided the draft has been
adopted by the forum 20 Furthermore, both drafts are worthy of atten-
tion as the considered and contemporary work of distinguished legal
scholars in Europe and the Western Hemisphere2 and as evidence of
a strong current toward unification which has gone largely unnoticed
in this country.
19 See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITIoN: DECIDING APPEALS 362
(1960).
20 INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL POUR I:UNIFICATION DU DROIT PRIVY, PROJET DVUNE
LOI UNIFORME SUR LA VENTE INTERNATIONALE DES OBnJETS M01ILIERS CORPORnES,
NouvEAu TEKTE "ILABOR PAR LA CommissioN ET RAPPORT DE LA CommissioN 28
(1956).
21 Those who participated in the Rome Draft include Judge Algot Bagge, Presi-
dent (Sweden), Professor Tullio Ascarelli (Italy), Professor Frederico de Castro
y Bravo (Spain), Professor Max Gutzwiller (Switzerland), Dean Joseph Hamel
(France), Dr. Georg Petersen (Germany), Judge Otto Riese (Germany), and Pro-
fessor Benjamin Atldnson Wortley (Great Britain). The Inter-American Draft
was revised from the earlier versions by Mr. Hugo Juan Gobbi of Argentina.
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Although the two drafts are mutually exclusive alternatives,
neither ought to preclude the concurrent use of standard form contracts,
such as the ECE conditions, as a legitimate exercise of the autonomy
of the parties. It is therefore unsettling to find that neither the Rome
Draft nor the Inter-American Draft provides that the offeror may vary
the rules of formation by incorporating different rules into his offer.22
Since the most suitable rules for contract formation-as well as for
sales generally-may differ from one trade or industry to another, it is
inconceivable that a satisfactory and acceptable uniform law should
contain mandatory rules on this subject.3 It is imperative that both
drafts be amended to include express provisions allowing variation by
incorporation of different rules in the offer. The discussion which
follows is based on the assumption that this will be done.
Because both drafts are tentative versions and will undergo further
changes, this article will examine only the basic rules and not the
details of draftsmanship. These rules will be compared with those
embodied in the ECE conditions and with those which we know in the
United States. To the American lawyer, however, the form and the
approach in drafting of both of the proposed uniform laws may be
even more striking than the differences of substance. It will be well
to dispose of these problems before turning to those of substance.
II. APPROACH AND FORM
Both the Rome Draft and the Inter-American Draft are char-
acterized by brevity and generality, particularly when their language
on contract formation is compared with that in which comparable rules
have been cast in the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
of Contracts. 4 In part this is the result of the draftsmen's desire to
limit the number of points upon which there could be disagreement by
omitting subjects or details which might stir controversy. In part it
is the result of a different and more concise style of draftsmanship
2 2 The Inter-American Draft contains several sections which expressly allow
variation by agreement, leaving the implication that other sections may not be varied
by agreement. See INTR-AMERICAN DRAFT arts. 32 ("Warranties of the buyer [sic]"),
38 ("Simultaneous delivery and payment").
2 3 The Uniform Commercial Code generally allows variations by agreement ex-
cept in such matters as good faith, due diligence, and commercial reasonableness,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3), and the Hague Sales Draft allows the
parties complete freedom to vary its provisions by specific agreement, HAGuE SALEs
DRAFT art. 3.
24 For the benefit of foreign readers, it should be explained that the Uniform
Commercial Code is the joint product of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. It was proposed in its
present form in 1957 and has already been adopted in more than a dozen states. The
Restatement of Contracts, sponsored by the American Law Institute, is an attempt
by a group of distinguished scholars to state the prevailing rules in this field as found
largely in the decisions of American courts. It was published in 1932 and is now being
revised. It does not, of course, have the force of law.
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traditionally found in civil law codes. These characteristics would be
less of an obstacle to acceptance among American lawyers were it not
for the fact that both drafts purport to be complete and sufficient in
themselves. Each completely excludes application of national law "in
matters covered by it," according to the language of the Inter-
American Draft,25 and "in cases to which it is applicable," according
to the formulation of the Rome Draft.26 The basic approach thus
differs sharply from the uniform laws in the United States, which are
regarded less as complete replacements for prior law than as codifica-
tions of existing law. The American uniform laws provide that they
shall be supplemented by the principles of law and equity, insofar as
these are not displaced by express provisions.27 They do not attempt
to replace state law entirely, even on matters within their scope. There
is, however, considerably less uniformity, even among the nations of
Western Europe or Latin America, than among the states of the
United States. For this reason it would be no easy task to follow the
American pattern by preserving a body of basic principles to supple-
ment the brief rules of the drafts, without at the same time opening the
door to a variety of different national rules in the hands of different
national tribunals.
Perhaps the choice which has been made of completely excluding
national law is the only one feasible for a statute which aims at com-
plete codification of the subject. But if this is so, something should be
done to fill out the bare skeleton of rules erected in the drafts. For
example, neither contains any provision on the effect of a rejection to
terminate an offer,2" nor does either address itself adequately to the
problem of an offer which is delayed in transmission. 9 The further
provision of the Rome Draft that matters not "expressly settled by the
present law . . . shall be regulated in accordance with the general
principles on which it is based" 'o seems especially difficult of applica-
tion, since the source from which these principles might be deduced
comprises only fourteen relatively short articles. The separation of the
Rome Draft from the longer Hague Sales Draft aggravates this prob-
lem; it might be preferable to make the Rome Draft an optional addi-
tion to the longer and presumably less controversial sales draft, rather
than an independent statute. Several examples should suffice to illus-
strate these difficulties.
25 I N?-AmucAN DRAT art. 4.
26 Rom DRAFr art. 1.
27 See, e.g., UNiFom SALEs AcT § 73; UznioRm CoMMRI.A CoDE § 1-103.
28 See note 60 infra.
29 See pp. 318-19 infra.
30 RoME DRAFT art. 1.
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A. Generality-Definition of Offer
The definition of an offer in the Rome Draft shows the generality
of some of the provisions. It provides that a communication "shall not
constitute an offer . . .unless the terms of the contract are sufficiently
detailed to permit its conclusion by acceptance and unless the person
who makes the communication must be considered as having the inten-
tion to bind himself." "' Not only is this language too vague to be
of much help in the kinds of situations which cause trouble but the
test for determining whether a communication is sufficiently definite
to constitute an offer is circular. It can hardly be regarded as an
adequate substitute for the more detailed rules found in most legal
systems and would merely invite any tribunal to fill in the lacunae by
application of its own domestic law, contrary to the stated purpose of
the draft. 2
B. Brevity-Requirement of a Writing
The articles of both drafts dealing with the requirement of a writ-
ing evidence the problems raised by brevity. Since England's repeal
of the Statute of Frauds as applied to the sale of goods in 1954,' the
United States has been the world's leading exponent of such a require-
ment and has retained it, with some amelioration, even under the
Uniform Commercial Code.s4 It is therefore distressing to an Ameri-
can lawyer that both drafts mishandle the problem of the Statute. The
Rome Draft provides merely that "no set form shall be prescribed for
an offer or for an acceptance," " and the Inter-American Draft that
"a contract of international sale does not require any special form. It
may be proved by witnesses." " Even if one gives both drafts the
most charitable interpretation and admits that their apparent objective
of abolishing the Statute may be desirable in international sales, it
must be conceded that they miss the mark. Perhaps the difficulty is
due in part to an insufficient understanding by the draftsmen of the
nature of the Statute as distinguished from its civil law analogues. For
3 1 RomE DRAFT art. 3. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204.
32 Neither draft contains a provision comparable to those of the Uniform Acts
in the United States which require that the act be interpreted to effectuate its general
purpose of making uniform the law. See, e.g., UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 74; UiiFoRm
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102 (2) (c). Such a provision would probably be repugnant
to jurists of countries such as France, where the courts, ostensibly at least, do not
rely upon prior decisions, even when they are from the same jurisdiction, as precedents.
33 Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34.
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201.
3 5 ROME DRAFT art. 14. The word "set" does not appear in the original French:
"Aucune forme n'est prescrite."
86 INTER-AmERIcAN DRAFT art. 8.
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it does not require a "set form," "special form," or indeed any form,
for an offer, for an acceptance, or even for a contract. None of these
need be in writing at all. The Statute as it appears in the Uniform
Commercial Code merely requires for enforcement of a contract, in the
absence of other evidence such as payment or delivery, that there be
"some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been
made. . .. ,, 37 The making of the writing may be subsequent to the
making of the contract, as by a letter of confirmation, and the contract
itself may be "proved by witnesses," if written evidence of its making
is available. Thus neither provision, in its present succinct form, is
adequate expressly to repeal the Statute of Frauds3
The form of the drafts thus poses an initial stumbling block to
their acceptance in the United States. While both would completely
replace domestic law in international transactions, neither offers a
formula which is an adequate substitute for domestic law from the
standpoint of either completeness or clarity. Beyond this, there are
important problems of substance. The most interesting can be grouped
under two headings: first, revocation of communications and time of
formation and, second, sufficiency of acceptance.
III. REVOCATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TIME OF FORMATION
Although neither of the drafts is restricted to contracts by corre-
spondence, both draft laws as well as the ECE conditions show primary
concern with the problems raised by this method of contracting, be-
cause international sales contracts are so often concluded in this way,
rather than face to face or by telephone. The difficulty is that due to
delays in the transmission of correspondence, neither party can be
aware of the other's current state of mind. To protect their justifiable
expectations and terminate the correspondence at some point, a con-
tract must be found even in many cases where one party has had a
change of mind which he did not or could not communicate to the
3 7 UNIFORuE CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
38It is true that the general provisions of both drafts which displace domestic
laws in "matters" or "cases" where they apply may appear broad enough to displace
the Statute without explicit repeal. Yet if the drafts' provisions as to formation
should displace the Statute of Frauds, which, strictly spealdng, applies to enforce-
ability rather than to formation, one may ask what effect they might have on the
rule regarding the use of parol or extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of an agree-
ment-the so-called "parol evidence rule." See UNIFORM COMERcIAL CODE § 2-202.
Some of the ECE conditions have clauses invoking a similar rule. The following
is found under "Formation of Contract!' in ECE, GENmuL CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT
AND IMPORT OF SAWN SOFTWOOD para. 2.7 (U.N. Doe. No. ME/410/56) (1956):
"After formation of the contract, all previous negotiations, oral or in writing, con-
trary to the contract shall cease to have effect." Both drafts are silent on this matter,
and it is certainly arguable that it is as closely related to the general subject of
"formation' as is the Statute of Frauds and thus might be part of the domestic law
to be replaced.
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other-where there is no actual mutual assent at any one moment.
Because the issues are complex, some preliminary analysis of a simple
but standard transaction may be helpful.
A. Events Capable of Legal Significance
The conclusion of a contract by correspondence usually involves
at least four events which may be given legal significance: (1) the
offeror dispatches his offer to the offeree; (2) the offer reaches the
offeree; (3) the offeree dispatches his acceptance to the offeror; and
(4) the acceptance reaches the offeror. There are two views on when
a communication has "reached" one of the parties, one taking the
time when it is delivered at the recipient's address and the other the
time when it actually comes to his attention. 9  Although the latter
has appeal in the context of consensual transactions, the former is
the more practical solution, mainly because it permits greater ease of
proof. It has been used in the Rome Draft, under which a com-
munication has "reached" (parvenu) a party when it has been "de-
livered at [his] . . . address." "' The Restatement of Contracts and
the Uniform Commercial Code make the same choice.41 The Inter-
American Draft contains no provision on the point since, as will be
seen, the time when a communication reaches the parties is not made
material under any of its sections. And the ECE conditions do not
define when a communication "reaches" one of the parties, even when
this fact is crucial.
B. Basic Questions Involved
In the analysis of a legal problem arising out of an attempt to
conclude a contract by correspondence, four common questions may
arise which can be answered in terms of the four events listed above.
(1) How long does the offeror retain the power to revoke his offer?
(2) How long does the offeree retain the power to bind the offeror
by his acceptance? (3) Who bears the risk of loss or delay in trans-
mission of the acceptance? (4) How long does the offeree retain the
power to revoke his acceptance? Each of these should be clearly and
satisfactorily answered by any set of rules governing the formation
of contracts.
39 See generally AVANT-PROJECT D'UNE Loi UNIFoRn SUR LA Fom mATIo DES
CONTRACTs INTERNATIONAUX PAR CORRESPONDANCE 21-23 (1937).
40 RoME DRAFT art. 10. The English translation of the French text of the draft
renders "parvenir" as "to communicate" rather than "to reach." The latter seems
both more literal and more correct.4 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 69 (1932); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§1-201
(25), (26), (27).
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How long does the offeror retain the power to revoke his offer?
The question of the revocability of an offer is one of the most challeng-
ing that must be faced by the draft laws, both because of its consider-
able practical importance and because of the variety of answers given
in various legal systems. Under the common-law rule as applied in
the United States, an offer usually may be revoked until an acceptance
is dispatched.' The most serious problem to have arisen under this
rule is that of the firm offer. At common law, a simple promise by
the offeror not to revoke the offer is insufficient to bind the offeror
and create a firm offer, because such a promise is unsupported by
consideration. But the offeror's broad power of revocation is
limited somewhat by the corollary that the act of acceptance occurs
when an acceptance is dispatched, not when it is received, if the means
of transmission is that customarily used or is the same as that used
by the offeror or is that specifically authorized by the offeror 3  More
important than this mollifying corollary is the fact that the rule itself
has been changed in New York by special statute 44 and in a sub-
stantial number of other states by the Uniform Commercial Code. 5
In these states an offeror may, at least under certain circumstances,
make a firm offer if the offer is put in writing. The Code rule is
limited to offers by a "merchant," who must generally be one who
deals in the kind of goods involved in the transaction4 While the
bulk of international trade is probably carried on by those who meet
the Code's definition of merchant, this restriction is bound to be fre-
quently troublesome and confusing to foreigners. Nevertheless, the
trend toward recognition of firm offers is clear in the United States.
It is surprising that no attempt has been made in the Inter-
American Draft to deal with the problem. The draft provides only
that "the offer may be withdrawn . . . up to the moment of the
dispatch of the acceptance," 47 which is essentially the rule that has
caused difficulty in this country. The Rome Draft comes closer to
current thinking in the United States. It provides that if an offer
is not a firm offer, it may be revoked if the revocation reaches the
offeree before he sends an acceptance; but if it is a firm offer it may
not be so revoked, although it may be withdrawn if the communication
42 See RESTATE xT, CONTRACTS § 41 (1932).
4 3 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 64, 66 (1932).
"N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 33(5).
45 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205.
4 6
U NIFOR COMMERCIAL CoDE §2-104(1). The Code also limits the duration
of firm offers to three months and requires that the offeror sign separately the terms
of a firm offer if they appear on a form supplied by the offeree. UNIFORM Com-
xmC.AL CODE § 2-205.
47 INTER-A ICAN DRAFT art. 7.
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of withdrawal reaches the offeree before or at the same time as the
offer.48 The statutes in the United States have no provisions on the
point of withdrawal, but the rule would presumably be the same.49 It
is difficult to conceive how a modern statute on the formation of con-
tracts, particularly in international trade, could do an effective job
without solving the firm offer problem. In this respect, the Rome
Draft is adequate and in keeping with modern day commercial needs.
But the Inter-American Draft fails completely and should be revised
to take account of this problem.
The Rome Draft and the firm offer statutes in the United States
differ as to how to determine whether or not an offeror has made a
firm offer. Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the New York
statute, the offer is not a firm offer unless the offeror has so stated in
the offer, which must be in writing and signed.5" Under the Rome
Draft, any offer is a firm offer and irrevocable for at least a reasonable
time "unless the offeror has reserved to himself the right of revocation
in the offer." " Thus in the case of silence as to revocability, an
offer is revocable under the American statutes, but firm under the
Rome Draft. There is a practical reason to prefer the American rule;
the rule of the Rome Draft will more often give rise to uncertainty as
to the duration of the period of irrevocability, for the question of what
is a "reasonable" time may arise in any case where the offer is silent
as to revocability. Under the American statutes the question of what
is a "reasonable" time can only come up in the rare case in which the
offeror states that his offer is irrevocable without setting a period of
irrevocability. Furthermore, the ECE conditions indicate that the
American view prevails in the industries and trades in which they
have considered the problem. The conditions for sawn softwood,
citrus fruit, and solid fuels all provide that an offer is revocable if not
described as a firm offer.5 2  The conditions for plant and machinery
are silent on this point.'
4 8 ROME DRAFT art. 4.
49 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 23 (1932).
59 N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 33(5); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL COnE § 2-205.
51 ROME DRAFT art. 4.
52 ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SAWN SOFTWOOD para.
2.3 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/410/56) (1956); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE Ex-
PORT AND IMPORT OF SOLID FUELS para. B.3 (slip note) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 59.11.
E/Mim.1) (1958); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
CITRUS FRUITS para. 2.2 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58.II.E/Mim.12) (1958).
53ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF PLANT AND MACHINERY FOR
IMPORT AND EXPORT (U.N. Doc. No. ME/188 bis/53) (1953), (U.N. Doc. No.
ME/574/55) (1955); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE SUPPLY AND ERECTION
OF THE PLANT AND MACHINERY FOR IMPORT AND EXPORT, (U.N. Pub. Sales No.
1957.II.E/Mim.3), (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957.II.E/Mim.4). None of these docu-
ments disposes of the question whether a specification by the offeror of a time limit
operates also as an undertaling that the offer will be kept open for that length of
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This much is certain: outside of the diminishing number of juris-
dictions where a firm offer is impossible, the offeror has the power to
determine the revocability of his offer if he does so explicitly and in a
signed writing. Where he has not been explicit, his own intention, as
well as the understanding of the offeree, may depend both on the legal
systems and the trade or industry with which the parties are familiar.
There is at present little evidence to support any general rule of
interpretation for international sales contracts as a whole. It is there-
fore unfortunate that neither the Rome nor Inter-American projects
has included a study of existing business practices and understandings
in this matter in international sales. But regardless of existing prac-
tices and irrespective of any statutory rule of construction, as long as
a firm offer is possible, a standard form contract can effectively control
the outcome in any particular case. And regardless of what general
rule might be chosen for a statute on formation of international sales
contracts, the need would remain for standard form contracts to meet
the special needs of different commodities.'
How long does the offeree retain the power to bind the offeror
by his acceptance? This question is often stated in terms of when
does the offer lapse. In the United States, if a time for acceptance
has been fixed, it is usually sufficient if the acceptance has been dis-
patched before the end of the period, even if it reaches the offeror after
the expiration of the period. If no time has been fixed, it is sufficient
if it has been dispatched within a reasonable time.5 Under the Rome
Draft, however, if the offeror has fixed a time for acceptance, the offer
lapses if the acceptance does not reach the offeror within the time
fixed.5 If no time has been fixed by the offeror, the acceptance must
reach the offeror within the time fixed by any applicable usage, or, if
time. The 1936 Rome Draft took the awkward position that the offer was not a
firm offer unless the offeror had set a time limit for acceptance. INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF A UNIFORM
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS MADE BY CORRESPONDENCE art. 3 (1937).
54At least two other solutions to the problem of revocation have gained some
acceptance. One is based on the doctrine of culpa-in-contrahendo under which the
offeror who revokes may be held liable in damages if the offeree has in reliance on
the offer prepared to perform. See Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-
American Offer-ald-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 CoLUm. L. REv. 920, 924 (1936). The
other is the offer "sans engagement," under which an offer which does not have the
form of a firm offer is merely an invitation for a firm offer. One who issues such
an invitation and receives an offer in return is deemed to have accepted it if he does
not reject the offer within a reasonable time. Id. at 927.
55 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §40(1) (1932). Of course the offeror may
stipulate that the acceptance must reach him within the prescribed time. Lewis v.
Browning, 130 Mass. 173 (1891).
56 Ro E DRAFT art. 7. The draft does not, however, settle the question of whether
a period of time fixed by the offeror begins to run at the time the offer was sent, at
the time it was received, or at some other time. Nor is there any disposition of the
case of an offer which arrives late either when a period of irrevocability has been
set or not.
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there is none, "without undue delay." 57 This last phrase is defined to
mean "as short a time as possible in the circumstances, calculating
from the moment when the act may reasonably be performed." 58 The
Inter-American Draft gives no answer to when an offer lapses, an
omission which should be corrected. When an offer fixes a period
within which it must be accepted, the difference between the rule in
this country and that of the Rome Draft may be crucial, for under
the Rome Draft the offeree must count within the fixed period the time
for transmittal of the acceptance. But if no time is fixed, the differ-
ence is less important, since even under the Rome Draft the offeree is
entitled to allow time for transmission in determining a reasonable
time for acceptance.
Human nature being as it is, it may well be that the time of re-
ceipt is more often the understanding of the offeror and the time of
dispatch more often that of the offeree. Here too a study of prac-
tices and understanding in international sales would be useful. But
the question need not arise if the offeror, in fixing the period for ac-
ceptance, states whether dispatch or receipt of the acceptance is required
before its expiration; the most effective way to ensure that this is
done is through the use of a standard form contract with an appro-
priate provision. The ECE conditions contain such provisions, some
choosing the time of dispatch and others the time of receipt, to suit
the needs of various trades or industries. 9 This is another example
of a point on which there may be no general agreement but which can
be covered, in any particular case, as effectively by a standard form
contract as by legislation.'
Who bears the risk of loss or delay in transmission of the ac-
ceptance? This question is usually subsumed under the broader ques-
tion of when is the contract "concluded." Before the "conclusion" of the
contract, the risk of loss or delay in transmission of the acceptance is
on the offeree; afterwards it is on the offeror. In the United States
57 ROME DRAf art. 7.
58 ROME DRAr art. 11.
59 Dispatch: ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF PLANT AND MA-
CHINERY FOR IMPORT AND EXPORT para. 2.1 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/188 bis/53) (1953),
(U.N. Doc. No. ME/574/55) (1955); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE SUPPLY
AND ERECTION OF THE PLANT AND MACHINERY FOR IMPORT AND EXPORT, para. 2.1
(U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957.II.E/Mim.3), (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957.II.E/Mim.4).
Receipt: ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SAWN SOFTWOOD
para. 2.1 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/410/56) (1956); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SOLID FUELS para. B.2(a) (slip note) (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 59.II.E/Mim.1) (1958); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF CITRUS FRUITS para. 2.2 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58.II.E/Mim.12) (1958).
60 It should be noted that none of the documents discussed here explicitly provides
that a rejection by the offeree terminates the offer. Compare RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS § 35(1) (a).
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the contract is concluded upon dispatch of the acceptance, and the risk
of loss or delay falls on the offeror, provided the means of transmission
was authorized by the offeror."' The most common ground for finding
such authorization is that the offeror himself used the same means of
transmission in making the offer.' Under the Inter-American Draft
a contract by letter or telegram is concluded at the moment the letter
or telegram is dispatched,3 a similar rule but without the qualification
made in this country. The rationale of both rules is that the offeror,
by initiating the correspondence, takes the risk of deficiencies in the
means of communication which he has chosen. This loses sight of
the possibility that since other means of communication may not have
been practical, the offeror in reality may have had no choice, or that
the offeree himself may have initiated the correspondence by the
chosen means. It also puts on the offeror the difficult burden of re-
butting the offeree's evidence that he dispatched the acceptance in time.
The Rome Draft avoids this objection by providing that the contract
is not concluded until the acceptance reaches the offeror; the risks of
transmission therefore remain on the offeree.' Under this rule the
offeree must prove that the offeror received the acceptance in time, an
especially difficult task in the absence of any provision in the draft that
a properly dispatched communication is presumed to have been received
in due course." As between the rule of the Rome Draft, which may
leave the offeree to assume that he has made a contract which in law
he has not, and the rule in the Inter-American Draft and in the United
States, which may leave the offeror to assume that he has not made
a contract when in law he has, the choice is certainly not a clear one.
The ECE conditions display an ingenious variety of solutions to
the problem. Those for plant and machinery adopt the rule that the
contract is concluded when an acceptance is dispatched, but provide
that if the offeror has specified a time limit for acceptance, there shall
be no contract unless the acceptance reaches the offeror within one
week after the expiration of the time limit, thus placing most of the
risk on the offeree. 8 Those for sawn softwood, solid fuels, and
citrus fruit adopt the rule of the Rome Draft when the offer is a firm
6 1 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 64 (1932).
6 2 See RESTATEMENT, CONTnACTS § 66 (1932).
6 3 INT R-A.MEEcAN DRAFT art. 6.
64 RoME DRAT art 12.
65Article 8 does bar an offeror from making a late objection to a delayed ac-
ceptance.
66 ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF PLANT AND MACHINERY FOR
IMPORT AND EXPORT para. 2.2 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/88 bis/53) (1953), (U.N. Doc.
No. ME/574/55) (1955); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE SUPPLY AND ERECTION
OF PLANT AND MACHINERY FOR IMPORT AND EXPORT para. 22, (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 1957.II.E/Mim.3) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 1957.II.E/Mim.4).
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offer, so that the contract is concluded only upon receipt of the ac-
ceptance, thus placing the risk squarely on the offeree.67  For other
offers, however, the contract is concluded neither upon the mailing of
the acceptance by the offeree nor upon its receipt by the offeror, but
only upon a further event-receipt of an acknowledgment or con-
firmation sent by the offeror to the offeree.68 Once more, this di-
versity shows both the difficulty of reaching accord on a single rule
for all international sales and the possibility of resolving the problem
by standard form contracts.
The time when the contract is concluded has a number of effects
not directly related to the existence of the contract. Under the Hague
Sales Draft, it may be important in deciding whether there has been
a fundamental breach,6" in fixing the time" and place 71 for delivery,
in determining the right to examination 2 and security,"3 and in com-
puting the price 4 and damages. 5  Under the Inter-American Draft
it may determine when the seller must hold the goods at the disposal
of the buyer.7' And it may also locate the place where the contract
was concluded and thus be relevant under applicable conflict of laws
rules. These issues too can be settled by proper counselling in advance
and by the use of standard form contracts, as well as by the adoption
of a uniform law.
How long does the offeree retain the power to revoke his ac-
ceptance? This may seem a peculiar question to the American lawyer
since, in general in this country, an acceptance is irrevocable from the
same moment that the risk of transmission passes to the offeror upon
the dispatch of the acceptance.77  Even the offeree's power to with-
draw his letter from the mails does not prevent its mailing from op-
17ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SAWN SOFTWOOD
para. 2.1 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/410/56) (1956); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR
THE EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SOLID FUELS para. B.2(a) (slip note) (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 59.II.E/Mim.1) (1958); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF CITRUS FRUITS para. 2.1 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58.II.E/Mim.12) (1958).
68 ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SAWN SOFTWOOD
para. 2.4 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/410/56) (1956); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SOLID FUELS para. B.2(b) (slip note) (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 59.II.E/Mim.1) (1958); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF CITRUS FRUITS para. 2.2 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58.II.E/Mim.12) (1958).
69 See HAGUE SALES DRAFT art 15.
70 See HAGUE SALES DRAFT art. 24.
7 1 
See HAGUE SALES DRAFT art. 25.
72 See HAGUE SALES DRAFT art. 47.
73 See HAGUE SALES DRAFT arts. 82, 84.
74 
See HAGUE SALES DRAFT arts. 67, 69.
75 See HAGUE SALEs DRAFT arts. 50, 94, 98, 99.
76 See INTER-AMERIcAN DRAFT art. 14.
77 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 64, 66 (1932).
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erating as an irrevocable acceptance. 7  Presumably the provision of
the Inter-American Draft that a contract by letter or telegram is con-
cluded at the moment the acceptance is dispatched " has the same effect.
Yet there is no reason in logic why the acceptance must be irrevocable
as of the moment that the risk of transmission passes to the offeror.
It was not so under the earlier draft prepared by the Council of Jurists
at Buenos Aires in 1953, which contained an additional section, since
deleted, providing that "the acceptance is revoked if the offeree's re-
traction reaches the offeror before or simultaneously with the ac-
ceptance." '0 A similar rule is applied in most cases under the 1936
draft of the Rome Institute."1 Under the current Rome Draft, the
same rule for revocation of acceptance is retained,s2 but the risk of
transmission, as already mentioned, has been shifted to the offeree.
The rule allowing revocation of acceptance up to the time of receipt
is an appealing one, since the offeror can suffer no prejudice by the
revocation of an acceptance of which he is unaware. But again, there
is no reason why the offeror cannot settle this question by express pro-
vision in his offer, so that the offeree, by sending his acceptance, will
be bound by whichever rule the offeror has selected. The rule of the
Rome Draft appears to be implicit in some of the ECE conditions,"8
but not in others.
In sum, both the Rome Draft and the Inter-American Draft have
had to make difficult choices among conflicting rules of various legal
systems on the four questions raised above. Although the rules of the
Inter-American Draft are generally less in conflict with those applied in
the United States, they are much less complete and explicit than those of
the Rome Draft. Two conclusions apply equally to both drafts. First,
if amended to allow variation by agreement, neither should prevent the
parties from adopting any other rules in this matter, including those
now applied in the United States. Second, neither draft need be en-
781 CoRBNn, CONTRACTS § 80 (1950).
79 IN-R-AimacAx DRAr art. 6.
80 See art. 2.4 of the DRAFT UNIFoRM LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY, in INTER-AERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS, FINAL ACT OF THE
SEcoND MEETNG 34 (1953).
8 1 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF A UNIFORM LAW ON INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS MADE BY CORRESPONDENCE
arts. 7, 8 (1937).
82Rom DRAFT art. 9. This should probably allow revocation "before or at the
same time as the acceptance" to be consistent with art. 4 on withdrawal of an offer.
83ECE, GEmR.L CONDITIONS OF EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SAWN SOFTWOOD
para. 2.1 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/410/56) (1956); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SOLID FUELS para. B.2(a) (slip note) (U.N. Pub. Sales
No. 59.II.E/Mim.1) (1958); ECE, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR THE: INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF CITRUS FRUITS para. 2.1 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58.II.E/Mim.12) (1958), all
of which provide that the contract is formed upon the receipt of the acceptance in
the case of a firm offer.
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acted in order to have its provisions on all but one of the questions dis-
cussed above made applicable by the choice of the parties, for revocation
of communications and time of formation are, with the exception of
firm offers in most of the United States, within the control of the
parties through the express terms of the offer itself.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF ACCEPTANCE
The legal sufficiency of a communication to constitute an ac-
ceptance and to conclude a contract may be challenged in a variety of
ways. It may be contended that the terms of the offeree's assent modi-
fied the terms of the offer, that the communication of the offeree's
assent arrived too late, or that the offeree's assent was not expressly
communicated to the offeror. The common-law view has been that
there is no contract in any of these situations. Too often the result
has been that a contracting party whom both parties had originally
assumed to be under a legally enforceable obligation can escape from
his supposed obligation when the turn of events makes his perform-
ance more difficult, more expensive, or otherwise less desirable. As a
result, there has been a tendency to relax the strict common-law rules.
A. Assent Modifying the Offer
The classic example of the first situation, in which it is contended
that the acceptance modifies the terms of the offer, is the "battle of the
forms," in which the offeror makes his offer on his printed form and
the offeree manifests his assent by sending a form of his own. When
the two forms contain slightly different terms, it is open to either party
to claim that there was not an acceptance but a counteroffer because of
the variation8 4 To avoid the harsh results of the common-law rule in
such cases, the Uniform Commercial Code contains an elaborate and
perhaps extreme set of rules which gives the offeree's assent effect as
an acceptance, in spite of additional or different terms, "unless ac-
ceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or
different terms." 11 New York has recently adopted a more limited
statute with a similar purpose86 Unfortunately, this trend towards
liberalization is not evidenced by either draft. The Inter-American
Draft is silent on the subject and the Rome Draft expressly reaffirms
that, "any acceptance containing additions, limitations or other modi-
fications shall be considered as a rejection of the offer received coupled
84 See RESTATEFENT, CoNTRAcTs §§ 60, 62 (1932).
8 5 U=FoRm COmmERCIAL CODE § 2-207.
86 N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 84-a.
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with a new offer." 87 It contains the further curious rule that if the
original offeror should promptly accept the modifications contained in
the offeree's counteroffer, this shall have the same effect as an ac-
ceptance by the offeree of the original offer with the modifications,
rather than as an acceptance by the offeror of the counteroffer.8 8 No
explanation accompanies this rule, which would result in an earlier
time for conclusion of the contract and would give rise to uncertainty
as to the offeree's power to revoke his counteroffer before the offeror's
final acceptance of the modifications.
The problem of variation between offer and acceptance is perhaps
even more important in international transactions, where it is often
complicated by a language barrier, than in domestic transactions, and
neither draft contains adequate provisions in this respect. While the
general use of a single set of standard forms such as the ECE condi-
tions will help to prevent the problem from arising by reducing the
likelihood of minor variations, a standard form of offer can not effec-
tively resolve the problem which is raised when a variation has in fact
occurred.
B. Late Acceptance
The second problem, that of late acceptance, has not been the
subject of legislation in the United States, and the strict common-law
rule prevails. While the Inter-American Draft does not treat the
subject at all, the Rome Draft has a questionable provision giving the
offeror the option of treating the acceptance as timely if he promptly
notifies the offeree to this effect.89 The objection to this rule is that
it enables the offeror to speculate on fluctuations in the market and on
changes in other conditions between the time when the offeree sent
the acceptance and the time when the offeror must decide whether to
consider it as an acceptance. This rule has been expressly rejected by
the Restatement of Contracts.0  Beyond the fact that the offeror can,
as has already been pointed out, make clear the time limit for accept-
ance, there is probably little which the parties can do-or would wish
to do-through the use of standard forms to deal with the case of late
acceptance.
C. Failure To Communicate Assent to Offeror
The third problem, that of the offeree's failure expressly to com-
municate his assent to the offeror, arises when acceptance is claimed
87 Rom DRAFT art. 6.
88 Ibid.
89 Romm DRA.r art. 8.
0 IZEsTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs § 73 (1932).
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by virtue of an act or of mere silence. Both means of acceptance are
possible in the United States under certain conditions. 1  Again the
Inter-American Draft is the less explicit of the two proposed statutes
and merely states that the contract is concluded when the offeree "gives
his acceptance, express or implied, to the offer. ." " The
Rome Draft provides that acceptance may consist "of any act which
may be considered to be equivalent to an acceptance either by virtue
of the offer or as a result of earlier dealings between the parties." "
The Rome Draft therefore comes closer to the Uniform Commercial
Code, under which "an offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in
the circumstances" '4 and "conduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a con-
tract." " No specific mention is made of acceptance by silence in the
Code or in either of the two drafts. However, the Code, as was men-
tioned earlier, is to be read against the background of case law which
has recognized acceptance by silence in exceptional cases,9 while the
two drafts purport to stand by themselves. Furthermore, the require-
ment of an "act" in the Rome Draft seems to preclude acceptance by
silence, while the language of the Code does not.
In the case of acceptance by conduct, both the Rome Draft and
the Code require confirmation, a requirement which would be called
into play in the common case of a seller's acceptance by shipment of
goods. Under the Rome Draft the offeree must "without undue de-
lay . . .send to the offeror a notice informing him of the performance
of the act which amounts to acceptance." " Under the Code the offeror
must be "notified of acceptance within a reasonable time." 98 The
difference is in the consequences of the offeree's failure to comply.
Under the Rome Draft he must merely "make good any damage
caused by his omission," 99 while under the Code the offeror "may
treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance." 100 The less severe
sanction of the Rome Draft seems adequate and, although it raises the
problem of proof of damages, it does not give the offeror the oppor-
91 See text accompanying notes 95, 96 infra.
92 INTER-AMERICAN DRAFT art. 5.
93 ROME DRArT art. 5.
9 4 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(1) (a).
9 5 UNIFORM COMIMERCIAL CODE § 2-207(3).
96 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 72 (1932).
9 7 RoME DRAFT art 5.
98 UNIFORM COmmERClAL CODE § 2-206(2).
9 9 RoME DRAFT art. 5.
1 0 0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206 (2).
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tunity to speculate on a change in the market or other conditions, as
he may under the Code. This is a problem which can be dealt with
effectively by standard contract forms, and the ECE conditions resolve
it by requiring acceptance by means of the sending or receipt of com-
munications rather than by other acts of the parties.' 01 Even where
shipment of the goods or other conduct is a recognized and desirable
means of acceptance, appropriate rules for acceptance and confirmation
can be provided by standard clauses in the offer.
So even in the matter of the sufficiency of a communication to
constitute an acceptance, the will of the parties, implemented by careful
drafting, can avoid most problems. It is curious that the most in-
tractable of these, that of variation between offer and acceptance, where
legislation is particularly needed, has been ignored in one draft and
scorned in the other.
V. CONCLUSIONS
While the preceding has not exhausted the subject of formation
of international sales contracts, even as reflected in the Rome and
Inter-American drafts, it may have been sufficient to indicate the
difficulties of either draft's being received warmly in the United States.
These difficulties stem both from differences in the approach to the
drafting of legislation and from differences in substance-no doubt
also from the bar's conservatism and suspicion of such efforts and from
the reluctance of Congress to exercise its constitutional power in this
area of international or even interstate commerce. In contrast, the
example of the ECE conditions offers a more immediate and practical
means of unification; the problems which cannot be resolved in this
way are indeed few. Rather than risk the continued failure of the
United States to participate in attempts at international unification, it
would be desirable to explore two avenues of approach to this goal in
which the promise of fruition is not entirely illusory as far as this
country is concerned.
A. Standard Contracts
The first approach would be to follow the lead of the ECE condi-
tions in an attempt to find agreement on standard contract terms, in-
cluding those relating to formation, in those fields of international
trade which are of especial interest to the United States. There is no
reason why such an attempt, perhaps limited at first to trade among
the Americas, should not succeed as it has in Europe. In any event,
101 c ECE, GENERAL CoN~inroNs OF EXPORT AND IMPORT OF SAWN SoMvooD
para. 2.1 (U.N. Doc. No. ME/410/56) (1956).
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an inquiry into business practice would be a logical first step toward
unification by means of legislation. Even in the heyday of the law
merchant, uniformity was bottomed on "that sympathy, concordance,
and agreement" as to custom which must be restored on the level of
practice before unification through comprehensive legislation can be
truly effective.1"2
B. Elimination of Impediments in National Law
The second approach would be to identify and examine, in the
course of such an effort, those impediments raised by national law to
legitimate attempts toward unification by standard contract forms.
Two examples of such impediments are the difficulty of making firm
offers and the problems posed by variation between offer and accept-
ance. Neither of these can be successfully attacked by a well-drafted
standard form. Specific legislative proposals, restricted to international
transactions and limited to identifiable obstacles to the resolution of
problems by contract, would be easier to justify and would stand a
better chance of enactment than any comprehensive scheme such as
those of the Rome and Inter-American drafts.
Neither of these proposals is intended to disrupt the progress to-
ward unification exemplified by these two drafts. They are suggested
merely as less ambitious steps toward the same goal, in the hope that
the United States, with its rich experience in unification of its
domestic law, may be able to take a more active and constructive part
in the work of unification on an international scale.
102 It should be mentioned in this connection that the International Chamber of
Commerce, in which the United States does play an active role, has made very sub-
stantial contributions toward the unification of customs. Its work has not, however,
been directed at contract formation.
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APPENDIX I
"THE ROME DRAFT" *
ARTicLE 1. The present law shall replace the national laws of signatory States
in cases to which it is applicable in matters that it governs; if certain questions relating
to those matters have not been expressly settled by the present law, they shall be
regulated in accordance with the general principles on which it is based.
ARTIcLE 2. The present law shall apply to the formation of contracts which are
regulated by the Uniform Law on International Sales of Goods (Corporeal Movables).
ARTICLE 3. The communication which one person addresses to another with the
object of concluding a contract shall not constitute an offer within the meaning of
the present law unless the terms of the contract are sufficiently detailed to permit its
conclusion by acceptance and unless the person who makes the communication must
be considered as having the intention to bind himself.
ARic=m 4. The maker of an offer shall not be bound by it before it has been
communicated to the offeree; the offer shall be considered as not having been made if
the withdrawal of it shall be communicated to the offeree before the offer or at the
same time as the offer.
An offer which has arrived may not be revoked unless the offeror has reserved
to himself the right of revocation in the offer. Tacit intention in this matter shall
only be taken into account by reason of the nature of the transaction or the usages
to which the offeror has made reference or which persons finding themselves in the
situation of the offeror and the offeree consider to be generally applicable.
If the death of the offeror or his incapacity to contract results in the cessation
of the activity to which the offer was attached the offer may be revoked without undue
delay. The death or incapacity of the offeree before acceptance shall make the offer
lapse.
In all cases the revocation of an offer shall only have effect if it has been com-
municated to the offeree before he has sent off his acceptance or has done acts treated
as acceptance by virtue of Article 5.
ARTIcLE 5. Acceptance of an offer consists of a declaration communicated by the
offeror either verbally, by telephone, by Telex or any other method of direct com-
munication whether by post, telegraph or any messenger employed by the acceptor.
Acceptance may also consist of the delivery of a note or the payment of a price
according to the conditions of the offer, or of any act which may be considered to be
equivalent to an acceptance either by virtue of the offer or as a result of earlier
dealings between the parties. In such cases the acceptor without undue delay should
send to the offeror a notice informing him of the performance of the act which
amounts to acceptance; he must make good any damage caused by his omission (to
do this).
ARTICLE 6. Any acceptance containing additions, limitations or other modifi-
cations shall be considered as a rejection of the offer received coupled with a new
offer. If the author of the (original) offer without undue delay informs the other
side that he agrees to the modifications proposed by the other side the declaration of
the other side shall be equivalent to acceptance of the offer received with the proposed
modifications.
* INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT UNIFoP,2
LAw ON THE FOaa!ATION OF CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(CoPREAL MovABLES) (1959). Translated by Professor Benjamin Atkinson Wort-
ley, O.B.E., LL.D., Manchester University.
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ARac=m 7. When an offer is made verbally, by telephone, by Telex or any other
method of direct communication, acceptance shall only have effect if it is declared
immediately or if it is communicated to the offeror in the time he has fixed.
When an offer is made by post, telegraph or any messenger employed by the
offeror, acceptance shall only have effect if it is communicated to the offeror in the
time he has fixed.
When it is not necessary for an acceptance to be immediate and if the period has
not been fixed, acceptance shall only have effect if it is communicated to the offeror
in the time settled by the usages to which the offeror has made reference or which
persons finding themselves in the situation of the offeror and the offeree consider to
be generally applicable or, in the absence of such usages, without undue delay.
If an acceptance consists in some act other than the declaration referred to in
paragraph 2 of Article 5, the act shall only have effect if it is accomplished in the
periods laid down in the preceding paragraphs.
ARTicLE 8. If an acceptance arrives after the expiration of the periods laid down
in the preceding article, the offeror may nevertheless consider it to have arrived in
due time on condition that, without undue delay, he so informs the acceptor by direct
communication or sends him notice of this.
Nevertheless if it follows from indications carried on the acceptance itself that
the acceptance, although communicated late to the offeror, has been sent in such
circumstances that if the means of communication had been normal, it would have
arrived within the periods laid down, the acceptance shall be considered as having
arrived in due time unless the offeror shall without undue delay have informed the
acceptor, by direct communication or by the expedition of a notice, that he considers
his offer as lapsed.
ARicIE 9. An acceptance cannot be revoked unless the revocation is communi-
cated to the offeror before the acceptance.
ARnicE 10. "To communicate" within the meaning of the present law shall
mean delivered at the address of the person to whom the communication is directed.
ARTicLE 11. By the term "without undue delay" in respect of an act to be per-
formed, the present law means as short a time as possible in the circumstances, calcu-
lating from the moment when the act may reasonably be performed.
Communications required by the present law shall be made by the means usual
in such cases. If the offeror makes use of a rapid means of communication an equally
rapid method shall be used for the reply.
ARTIcLE 12. If an acceptance consists of a declaration, the contract shall be
concluded by the fact of the acceptance being communicated to the offeror in the
conditions laid down in the present law. The moment of the conclusion of a contract
shall be the moment when an acceptance is communicated to the offeror; nevertheless
if the acceptance is not communicated in the time fixed, but must, according to Article
8, be considered as having arrived in due time, the contract shall be deemed to have
been concluded on the expiration of the period in which the acceptance should have
been communicated to the offeror.
If the acceptance consists of an act other than a declaration the contract shall be
concluded by the performance of such act, according to the conditions laid down in
the present law and at the moment of such performance.
ARzicLB 13. If the offeror has expressly laid down particular forms or the
accomplishment of certain acts, for the validity of the acceptance, acceptance shall
only have effect if those conditions have been complied with.
ARTicL.E 14. No set form shall be prescribed for an offer or for an acceptance.
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APPENDIX II
"THE INTER-AMERICAN DRAFT" *
CHAPTER ONE-CHARACTERISTICS AND ELEMENTS OF THE CONTRACT
I. "LIMITS OF APPLICATION"
Scope of the contract
ARTIcLE 1. The provisions of the present law apply to international sales, irre-
spective of the civil or commercial character of the parties and the contract.
Characterizatimt
ARTICLE 2. An international sale is any contract concluded between parties that
have their places of business or habitual residence in the territory of different states,
in which the goods sold or the price whereof must be transferred from the territory
of the state where they are located to the territory of another state.
Purpose
ARTICLE 3. The present law governs the sale of tangible property, movable in
nature, with the exception of ships, vessels for use on inland waterways, aircraft and
currency.
Jurisdiction
ARTICLE 4. In matters covered by it, the present law excludes the application
of national laws, unless their application is provided for herein.
II. FORMATION OF TEE CONTRACT
Conclusion
ARTICLE 5. An international sale is considered concluded at the moment when
one of the parties gives his acceptance, express or implied, to the offer made to him
by the other party.
ARTICLE 6. If the contract was entered into by letter or telegram, it shall be
considered concluded at the moment the offeree has dispatched his acceptance
Withdrawal and lapse
ARTICLE 7. The offer may be withdrawn, or may lapse upon the death or legal
incapacity of the offeror, up to the moment of the dispatch of the acceptance.
Form and proof
ARTICLE 8. A contract of international sale does not require any special form.
It may be proved by witnesses.
* INTER-AmERICAN COUNCIL OF JURISTS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF CONVENTION
ON A UNIFORM LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
(1960). Only those portions of the draft which apply to the formation of international
sales contracts are reprinted here.
